Abstract. At Eurocrypt'98, Boyko, Peinado and Venkatesan presented simple and very fast methods for generating randomly distributed pairs of the form (x; g x mod p) using precomputation. The security of these methods relied on the potential hardness of a new problem, the so-called hidden subset sum problem. Surprisingly, apart from exhaustive search, no algorithm to solve this problem was known. In this paper, we exhibit a security criterion for the hidden subset sum problem, and discuss its implications on the practicability of the precomputation schemes. Our results are twofold. On the one hand, we present an e cient lattice-based attack which is expected to succeed if and only if the parameters satisfy a particular condition that we make explicit. Experiments have validated the theoretical analysis, and show the limitations of the precomputation methods. For instance, any realistic smart-card implementation of Schnorr's identi cation scheme using these precomputations methods is either vulnerable to the attack, or less e cient than with traditional precomputation methods. On the other hand, we show that, when another condition is satis ed, the pseudo-random generator based on the hidden subset sum problem is strong in some precise sense which includes attacks via lattice reduction. Namely, using the discrete Fourier transform, we prove that the distribution of the generator's output is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. The two conditions complement each other quite well, and therefore form a convincing picture of the security level.
Introduction
In many discrete-log-based protocols, one needs to generate pairs of the form (x; g x mod p) where x is random and g is a xed base. ElGamal 9] and DSS 13] signatures, Schnorr's 18, 19] and Brickell-McCurley's 4] schemes for identication and signature are examples of such protocols. The generation of these pairs is often the most expensive operation, which makes it tempting to reduce the number of modular multiplications required per generation, especially for smartcards. There are basically two ways to solve this problem. One way is 2 to generate separately a random x, and then compute g x mod p using a precomputation method 3, 7, 12] . The other way is to generate x and g x mod p together by a special pseudo-random number generator which uses precomputations. Schnorr was the rst to propose such a preprocessing scheme 18]. The scheme had much better performances than all other methods but there was a drawback: the ouptut exponent x was no more guaranteed to be random, and therefore, each generation might leak information. Indeed, de Rooij 6] showed how to break the scheme. Schnorr later proposed a modi ed version 19], which was also broken by de Rooij 8] .
At Eurocrypt'98, Boyko, Peinado and Venkatesan proposed new and very simple generators 2] to produce pairs of the form (x; g x mod p), which could reduce even further the number of necessary modular multiplications. The security of these methods apparently depended on a new problem, the so-called hidden subset sum problem: given a positive integer M and b 1 ; : : : ; b m 2 Z M , nd 1 ; : : : ; n 2 Z M such that each b i is some subset sum modulo M of 1 ; : : : ; n .
The problem borrows its name from the classical subset sum problem: given a positive integer M and b; 1 ; : : : ; n 2 Z M , nd S f1; : : :; ng such that b P j2S j (mod M). The most powerful known attack 5] against the subset sum problem reduces it to a shortest vector problem in a lattice built from b; 1 ; : : : ; n ; M. Provided a shortest vector oracle, the method succeeds with high probability if the density, de ned as d = n= log 2 M, is small, namely less than a constant approximately equal to 0.94. However, this method can hardly be applied to hidden subset sums: one cannot even build the lattice since the j 's are hidden. Actually, apart from exhaustive search, no algorithm was known to solve the hidden subset sum problem. And thus, according to the authors of 2], the problem was potentially harder than the subset sum problem. Still, they suggested high values of parameters to prevent any subset sum attack, for unknown reasons. For these choices of parameters, the scheme was not suited for smartcards, and the speed-up over other methods was questionable. It was therefore natural to ask whether or not, one could select small parameters in order to make the scheme very e cient, without a ecting the security. More generally, Boyko et al. raised the following question: how hard is the hidden subset sum problem ? The present paper provides an answer. We exhibit a security criterion for the hidden subset sum problem which is twofold. On the one hand, we present an e cient lattice-based algorithm to solve the hidden subset sum problem. It relies on a systematic use of the powerful notion of an orthogonal lattice, which was introduced at Crypto'97 14] by Nguyen and Stern as a cryptographic tool, and subsequently used in cryptanalysis 16, 15] . The algorithm is very di erent from known lattice-based methods to solve subset sums, but surprisingly, seems to generalize their results. More precisely, our algorithm is expected to succeed when the density d = n= log 2 M is very small. Unfortunately, this is exactly the case arising when one wants to make the scheme practical and more e cient than other exponentiation methods, in a smart-card environment. We have implemented the algorithm, and experiments have con rmed our analysis. On the other hand, we show that when the density is high, the pseudo-random generator based on the hidden subset sum problem is strong in some precise sense. Namely, using the discrete Fourier transform, we prove that the distribution of the generator's output is then statistically close to the uniform distribution. Such a result was already known (related results in 1, 10]), but our proof technique is di erent. Those results tend to prove that the hardness of the hidden subset sum problem is measured by the density, as for the subset sum problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the generators of pairs (x; g x mod p) proposed at Eurocrypt'98 in 2], and we clarify the relationships between the security of these schemes and the hidden subset sum problem. In section 3, we recall some facts on orthogonal lattices from 14]. Section 4 presents our lattice-based algorithm to solve hidden subset sum problems, and the experiments. In section 5, we discuss the hardness of the hidden subset problem, by measuring the randomness of the generator output. are just variants of the previous generator, using random walks. We will not discuss those, since the security of the generators relies on the same problem.
Parameters
The scheme needs to store n elements of Z M , and n elements of Z p . Recall that for DSS 13] and Schnorr 18, 19] , M has 160 bits, while for ElGamal 9] and , M has at least 512 bits. Each generation requires modular multiplications. When n=2, we say that the underlying hidden subset sum problem is sparse. The parameters n and must be su ciently large to prevent from birthday attacks. In 2], it was suggested to choose n = 512 and = 64. Comparisons with traditional precomputation methods were made, but only in the case of 512-bit exponents. Table 1 compares the scheme with several con gurations of the simple exponentiation method with precomputation of 12]. It shows that for a 160-bit exponent, the generator with the proposed parameters is worse in all aspects. For a 512-bit exponent, it is better: with similar storage, one gains 14 multiplications. But with other precomputation methods, there is no security issue since the exponent is random. Another issue is the viability of the scheme for low-computing-power devices. For instance, Thus, the parameters proposed in 2] are rather suited for server applications. In order to o er much better performances than other methods, one is tempted to decrease the parameters. We will discuss possible parameters when we present the experiments related to our attack.
Security Against Active Attacks
When the generator is used, the security seems to rely on the underlying hidden subset sum problem. Indeed, suppose for instance that the generator is used in thus gets many outputs of the generator, as y = k. After solving the underlying hidden subset sum problem, he knows the hidden 1 ; : : : ; n . He then issues the challenge 1 2 Z 2 t, to obtain k + s mod q for some unknown k a subset sum of the j 's. If n and are not too large, he can exhaustively search for the 0; 1-coe cients of the j 's to disclose k, and hence the secret key s.
Conversely, if the output of the hidden subset sum generator used is cryptographically pseudo-random, then the speeded-up versions of the following schemes are secure against polynomial time adaptive attacks, provided that the original schemes are secure: ElGamal, DSS and Schnorr signatures, Schnorr identi cation. (see 2]).
Security Against Passive Attacks
In 2] (Theorems 6 and 7, p.230), it was claimed that only the security against active attacks needed to assume the hardness of the hidden subset sum problem. However, it seems that the security against passive attacks actually relies on the potential hardness of a slight variant of the hidden subset sum problem, Assume for instance that the generator is used in Schnorr's signature scheme.
We keep the notations of the previous section. The public key is v = g ?s mod p. The signer generates a random pair (k; g k mod p). He computes a hash e = h(g k mod p; m) where m is the message, and y = k + es mod q. The signature is the pair (y; e). Notice that k = y ?es mod q is a hidden subset sum, where y and e are known and s is secret. Thus, a passive attacker is left with an a ne hidden subset sum problem with the pairs (y; ?e) and the modulus q. If he can solve this problem, he recovers the secret key s.
The previous remark can be adapted to the following schemes: Schnorr's and Brickell-McCurley's identi cation, ElGamal and DSS signatures. For example, in the case of DSS, a signature is of the form (a; b) where b = k ?1 (m + as) mod q, s is the secret key and m is the hash. Note that k = mb ?1 + ab ?1 s mod q is a hidden subset sum. But mb ?1 and ab ?1 are known, so this is again an a ne hidden subset sum problem, from which one can derive the secret key s.
We will see that our attack against the hidden subset sum problem can be adapted to the a ne hidden subset sum problem. It appears that the complexity of these problems is similar. 1=d ) is roughly equal to some universal constant . The goal of lattice reduction is to nd a reduced basis, that is, a basis consisting of reasonably short vectors. In the sequel, we will not need more precise de nitions, or very precise approximations for the shortest vector. In practice, one hopes to obtain su ciently reduced bases thanks to reduced bases in the sense of LLL 11], or its variants 17, 20] .
Let L be a lattice in Z m . The orthogonal lattice L ? is de ned as the set of elements in Z m which are orthogonal to all the lattice points of L, with respect to the usual dot product. We de ne the lattice L = (L ? ) ? , which is the intersection of Z m with the Q-vector space generated by L: it contains L and its determinant divides the one of L. The 1. From b, we determine the lattice L x , where L x is the lattice generated by the x j 's and k. 2. From L x , we derive the hidden coe cients x j 's. 3. Using b, the x j 's and M, we nally recover the weights j 's.
Note that this attack recovers all secret data, not just the j 's. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that L x has dimension n + 1, but the attack still applies when the dimension is less than n + 1. In other words, we assume that the x j 's and k are linearly independent, which is a reasonable assumption since the x j 's are random. We now detail the three steps. 
Disclosing the Hidden Lattice
The rst step is based on the following observation, which is a simple consequence of (2) 
The left-hand part is not large. In other words, this step is expected to succeed if the density n= log 2 (M) is very small, so that M 1=n is large.
Disclosing the Hidden Coe cients
In the second step, the lattice L x is known. The vectors x j 's are random and have entries in f0; 1g, therefore these are short lattice points in L x . Consider a short vector of some reduced basis of L x . If its entries are all in f0; 1g or f0; ?1g, it is very likely to be one of the x j 's. Otherwise, its entries are probably in f0; 1g, as it must be shorter than the x j 's. To get rid of these vectors, we transform the lattice L x : we double all the lattice points, and we add the vector 
A ne Hidden Subset Sums
In the case of a ne hidden subset sums, equation (2) The di erence with the hidden subset problem is that, this time, the vector k can be much bigger, due to the presence of s. More precisely, we have s M=2
and kck M p m=3, so that kkk M p m=12. In the appendix, we discuss how to modify the previous arguments to explain why the condition is still expected to be satis ed. Loosely speaking, when u is short, the vector p u cannot be guaranteed to be short, but all its entries except the last one are short, which suggests it cannot be a non-zero vector of v ? .
Step 2 remains unchanged. And in step 3, we solve a similar linear system which is induced by (5) . Therefore, the only di erence when attacking a ne hidden subset sums is that the underlying condition is less likely to be satis ed.
Experiments
We implemented our attack using the NTL 21] library version 3.1 developped by V. Shoup. We used two reduction algorithms: the LLL 11] algorithm to compute orthogonal lattices, and Schnorr's 17] Korkine-Zolotarev reduction algorithm with blocksize 20 to obtain better reduced bases. The implementation is fast:
when m 300 and M is no larger than 512 bits, the attack performed in less than 15 minutes on a 333MHz Ultrasparc-IIi. Heuristically, our attack works when the density is much smaller than 1, but only experiments can tell us what is exactly the limit. We stress that our implementation has not been optimized, which means that it might be possible to go a little bit further than what we obtained. For instance, one might try improved reduction algorithms such as 20]. In all our experiments, the attack worked as soon as step 1 was correct.
We rst experimented the attack on hidden subset sums. If M is a 160-bit number (resp. 512-bit) , the attack works up to n 45 (resp. 90) with m 90 (resp. 200). We were not able to attack larger values of n, even with larger values of m (up to 400). For a ne hidden subset sums, results are not as good: if M is a 160-bit number (resp. 512-bit), the attack works up to n 35 (resp. 60) with m 90 (resp. 150). These results show that the conditions of validity for the attack which we gave previously are quite pessimistic. In particular, it appears that the attack is e ective against small values of n, which are required in a smartcard environment. Analysing table 1, we nd that in the smartcard case, the HSS generator cannot be more e cient than the method of LL 12] for 160-bit and 512-bit exponents.
However, there is quite a gap between the largest parameters that our attack can handle and the parameters suggested in the scheme. When M 1=n is very small, even very short vectors can be orthogonal to v , so that step 1 is highly unlikely to suceed. This is for instance the case with n = log 2 M. For such a n, our attack cannot even exploit the sparsity of the subset sums, and the best attack remains the birthday attack. It follows that if one is willing to pay with storage by choosing a su ciently large value of n to foil the attack, then one can choose a small to reduce signi cantly the computation time. This does not seem to be very useful in the 160-bit case, as LL's method o ers very good performances. But it improves the situation for 512-bit exponents. Hence, the hidden subset sum generator appears to be useful only for server applications, with exponents of at least 512 bits.
The Randomness of the Hidden Subset Sum Generator
We analyze the distribution of the output of the hidden subset sum generator, and discuss its implications on the security of the scheme. For xed M, the distribution is exponentially close (with respect to n) to the uniform distribution.
We provide a proof in two cases: when the 0; 1-coe cients are balanced, and when they are not. It was pointed out to us that such results were already known (technical result in 1], and a particular case is treated in 10]), but since our proof is quite di erent, we include it in appendix B. Our technique is based on the discrete Fourier transform, which might be of independent interest. The following result is proved in the extended version Thus, for a xed M, with overwhelming probability on the choice of the i 's, the distribution obtained by picking independently at random a polynomial number (in n) of outputs of the hidden subset sum generator corresponding to the 12 would serve as a distinguisher for those distributions, assuming that the underlying scheme is unbreakable. Note that it was the case of our lattice-based attack. Hence, the hidden subset sum generator is provably secure in this sense when the density is high. But this not very interesting from a practical point of view. Because when the density is high and the 0; 1-coe cients are balanced, the scheme does not save over the obvious square-and-multiply generator. However, for the moment, we do not know what happens precisely with the actual distribution of the generator, that is, when the subset sums are sparse. Our technique is able to deal with the case of unbalanced coe cients (see section B.2), but we are unable to extend it to the sparse distribution. Maybe the technique of 1] will be more useful.
Conclusion
Boyko et al. proposed several methods to produce simple and very fast methods for generating randomly distributed pairs of the form (x; g x mod p) and (x; x e mod N) using precomputation. For discrete-log-based schemes, the security of these generators against active attacks relied on the presumed hardness of the hidden subset sum problem. We showed that the security against passive attacks relied on a variant of this problem, which we called the a ne hidden subset sum problem. We provided a security criterion for these problems, based on the density. On the one hand, we presented an e ective lattice-based algorithm which can heuristically solve these problems when the density is very small. Experiments have con rmed the theoretical analysis, and show that the practical interest of the proposed schemes is marginal. When applied to protocols such as DSS, ElGamal, or Schnorr, the proposed methods cannot be signi cantly more e cient on smartcards than traditional exponentiation methods based on precomputation, without being vulnerable to attacks. On the other hand, we showed that when the density is high, the distribution of the output of the generator was exponentially close to the uniform distribution, which provides undistinguishability against polynomial-time adversaries. The two conditions complement each other, but there is still a gap. It would be interesting to reduce the gap, either by improving the attack, or the hardness results. In particular, it would be nice to obtain a hardness result of practical interest for the actual hidden subset sum generator which uses sparse subset sums. which is small for large m. But the explanations of section 4.1 regarding condition 4 are no longer convincing, because p u cannot be guaranteed to be short, even if u is very short (which it is). Recall that p u = (u:x 1 ; : : : ; u:x n ; u:k): All the dot products u:x j 's are still small, but the last coordinate u:k might be large, since k is long. However, we still expect that p u cannot be a non-zero vector of v ? if u is very short, because most of its coordinates are very small. To see this, let A be a bound for all the ju:x i j's, and B a bound for the last coordinate ju:kj. Denote that is, there must exist two distinct vectors z 1 and z 2 in S that have the same dot product with v , which yields by di erence an non-zero orthogonal vector to v . The rst n entries of this vector are less than A in absolute value, and the last entry is less than B in absolute value. This vector might be p u . But if A n B 2(nA + B)M, one does not expect any collision, and therefore p u is unlikely to be a non-zero vector orthogonal to v . The parameter B has limited in uence on this condition, it is the value of A which is preponderant. In other words, when u is short, p u is not necessarily short, but all its entries except the last one (which corresponds to k) are small. This makes a small bound for A and a large one for B, and therefore, the condition A n B 2(nA + B)M is nevertheless satis ed when the density is small.
B A Fourier Analysis of the Hidden Subset Generator
We compare the distribution of the output of the hidden subset sum generator with the uniform distribution, in two cases: when the 0; 1-coe cients are balanced, and when they are not.
B.1 The Basic Case
Let M be an integer, and let 1 ; : : : ; n be independently and uniformly chosen from 0::M ? 1]. We rst investigate the basic case where a linear combination n X j=1 x j j (mod M)
